constitutional lawPublished on Aug 24, 20265

Administrative Law in the Post-Chevron Era: The Major Questions Doctrine and Loper Bright Enterprises

Examining the seismic shift in federal regulatory jurisprudence, the dismantling of Chevron deference in Loper Bright, and heightened judicial scrutiny of agency rulemaking under APA § 706.

Dr. Marcus Thorne
Dr. Marcus Thorne
Professor of Constitutional Law & Civil Liberties
Administrative Law in the Post-Chevron Era: The Major Questions Doctrine and Loper Bright Enterprises

1. The Judicial Reset of the Administrative State

For four decades, federal administrative law was defined by the doctrine of judicial deference established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, when a federal court reviewed an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute it administered, the court engaged in a two-step inquiry: if Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue, the court enforced that statutory mandate; but if the statute was silent or ambiguous, the court was compelled to defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it was a permissible construction, even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently.

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), the Supreme Court fundamentally dismantled this framework, formally overruling Chevron and restoring independent judicial review of statutory interpretation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

2. The Holding of Loper Bright and APA § 706

Writing for the six-justice majority, Chief Justice John Roberts grounded the repudiation of Chevron in the explicit statutory text of Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706). Enacted in 1946, Section 706 commands that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”

The Court held that:

  • Constitutional Primacy of the Judiciary: As declared by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803), it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Delegating binding statutory interpretation to executive agencies violates fundamental constitutional separation of powers.
  • De Novo Judicial Review: Federal courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an administrative agency has acted within its statutory authority, without deferring to agency legal interpretations simply because a statute is ambiguous.
  • Skidmore Deference Replaces Chevron: While mandatory deference is abolished, courts may still accord non-binding, persuasive weight to agency views under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The weight granted depends entirely on the agency's thoroughness, valid reasoning, consistency, and persuasive power.

3. Interplay with the Major Questions Doctrine

The demise of Chevron operates in tandem with the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD), articulated in decisions like West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) and Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023). Under the Major Questions Doctrine, when an administrative agency claims statutory authority to decide an issue of vast “economic and political significance,” courts will not presume that Congress intended to delegate that power through vague, general, or ambiguous statutory language.

Instead, the agency must point to clear congressional authorization. In the post-Loper Bright landscape, regulatory agencies face a double barrier: if a rule involves a major question, it is struck down under the MQD absent explicit statutory text; and for all other statutory questions, federal judges will independently review the statute de novo under APA § 706 without deferring to the agency’s preferred interpretation.

4. The Impact on Corporate Regulatory Litigation

The abolition of Chevron has dramatically shifted the balance of power between regulated industries and federal administrative agencies (e.g., SEC, FTC, EPA, OSHA, CFPB, FDA):

  1. Vulnerability of Novel Agency Rules: Regulatory initiatives predicated upon broad statutory preambles or decades-old authorizing statutes face severe legal vulnerability in federal court.
  2. Forum Selection Primacy: Federal Circuit splits will multiply rapidly as regional courts of appeals interpret statutory terms independently without a unifying deference umbrella, making strategic venue selection critical.
  3. Statute of Limitations Reset under Corner Post: In Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 144 S. Ct. 2440 (2024), the Court held that the six-year general statute of limitations for APA challenges (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)) accrues not when the regulation is published, but when the individual plaintiff is first injured by the agency action, exposing longstanding federal regulations to fresh judicial challenge.

5. Strategic Recommendations for Regulated Entities

Corporate counsel and regulatory practitioners should adapt their administrative advocacy strategies:

  • Focus on Textual Canons, Not Agency Expertise: In administrative comment letters and court challenges, ground arguments in semantic textualism, dictionary definitions, and structural statutory placement rather than debating administrative policy reasonableness.
  • Invoke Skidmore Weaknesses: Document inconsistencies, agency reversals across presidential administrations, and procedural shortcuts to dismantle the persuasive weight of agency guidance.
  • Re-Evaluate Historical Regulations: Under Corner Post and Loper Bright, evaluate whether legacy regulatory burdens that previously survived Chevron review can now be successfully contested by newly incorporated corporate entities.

Editorial & Jurisprudential Disclaimer: This publication is prepared strictly for educational, academic, and legal research purposes and does not constitute formal legal counsel. For specific legal representation or jurisdiction-specific advice, consult a licensed attorney admitted to practice before the competent bar.

Educational Notice: This article is published for scholarly and research purposes and does not constitute attorney-client legal counsel.
Dr. Marcus Thorne

Dr. Marcus Thorne

Professor of Constitutional Law & Civil Liberties

⚖️ District of Columbia Bar

All publications by Dr. →

Professor Thorne holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School and teaches comparative constitutional law, judicial review, and federal appellate procedure.

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